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Rational Expectations in Agricultural Models: A Critical 
Review of the Concept and Its Use 
The role of anticipations on the part of economic agents as they 
attempt to solve the many economic decision problems which they face has 
been of serious interest to economists for decades. Anticipations of 
future events formed a cornerstone of J.R. Hicks theories of capital and 
economic motivation (Hicks). In that seminal work. agents anticipations 
or expectations of the future levels of prices. interest rates etc. were 
central to understanding economic motivation and ultimately economic 
choice. The concept of anticipation as a phycological phenomenom 
gra~ually gave way to the the equating of anticipations with expec-
tations as defined by the statistical concept. Various 'models' and 
hypotheses of expectations formation were advanced and incorporated in 
the existing literature on economic models. Various forms of expec-
tations were labeled naive, extrapolative. adaptive and rational. Each 
of these differing from the preceding by the amount of information one 
assumes is required to form the particular expectation at hand. Naive 
requiring only a single past observation on the variable in question 
while rational requires "all the relevant economic and non-economic 
information" at hand. With the work of Muth (1961) and the subsequent 
clarifications and extensions of the concept of ''rationally" formed 
expectations by Hanson and Sargent (1983). Wallis (1980.1981), Fisher 
(1982). and many others. rational expectations has become a central 
feature in many econometric modeling exercises. 
Also coupled with the development of rational expectations has been 
the work of Lucas(1976) on the appropriate methods whereby exogenous 
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policy variable changes may be incorporated into econometric models. The 
Lucas Critique. as it has been termed. argues that proper econometric 
policy modeling must account explicitly for the interactjon between the 
estimated reduced form parameters and the parameters of the policy 
variable prediction processes used by the economic agents characterized 
by the model. Failure to separate the parameters of the reduced form 
from those of the policy process will yield predictions which are in 
error when alternative policies are evaluated which imply new policy 
variable generating rules. 
In the decade of the 70's substantial interest has been generated 
concerning the appropriate manner in which to construct econometric 
models which exhibit "rational" expectations and are useful in alter-
native policy evaluations. Much of this work in the economics litera-
ture has been devoted to exploration of whether or not expectations are 
actually "rational" (Bray, Cyert and DeGroot. DeCanio. Frydman. 
Grossman). The econometrics literature has been filled with papers on 
the appropriate models and estimation techniques to empirically test the 
hypothesis (Wallis. 1980. Hoffman and Schmidt, Hoffman and 
Schlagenhauf). Agricultural economists have also joined the band wagon 
with an ever increasing amount ot research focusing on the inclusion of 
rational expectations in many different supply/demand models (Goodwin 
and Sheffrin. Huntzinger, F'isher. Nerlove. 1979). 
However. one cannot review much of the agricultural economics 
literature without the nagging suspicion that the inclusion of the 
rational expectations hypothesis is based on a too optimistic and 
uncritical view of the strengths and weaknesses of the hypothesis. Some 
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have argued that sound agricultural policy modeling is synonvmous with 
rational expectations without considering whether such an expectational 
hypothesis is plausible or even necessary to the Lucas critique (Fisher. 
p. 261). In particular. the frequency with which one can find the same 
well turned phrase relating to the virtues of the hypothesis from one 
article to another not to mention the dirth of well balanced references 
in these articles suggests that agricultural economists are in the 
process of embracing this hypothesis with the same amount of uncritical 
zeal with which the now out-of-favor adaptive hypothesis was once 
generally proclaimed. 
The purpose of this paper is to review the concept and selective 
claims of the rational expectations hypothesis. both as a plausible 
model of anticipations and as a useful tool in applied agricultural 
policy analysis. and to review the empirical evidence as to the veri-
fiable existence of rational expectations formation in agricultural and 
other economic markets. The conclusion of this paper is that the 
rationality hypothesis, although alluring on the face of it's logic and 
algebraic simplicity. requires the acceptance of too many unsubstan-
tiated attributes of human perception to be accepterl uncritically in 
agricultural supply and policy models. In fact. it is argued that in 
policy models. the Lucas critique is not synonymous with the rationality 
hypothesis. 
Since the work of Muth the literature focusing on the rational 
expectations hypothesis has grown considerably. The review presented 
here is not intended to be exhaustive of this literature. However, it 
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is the author's belief that it is representative of the conceptual and 
empirical evidence to date. 
RATIONAL EXPECTATIONS IN CONCEPT 
Consider the following general simultaneous equations model as 
presented in one form or another by Wallis (1980) and more recently 
Fisher (1982). 
(1) ..• 
where Yt is a vector of g endogenous variables, Y*t is a vector of g 
expected endogenous variables, x*1.t is a vector of k 1 expected exo-
genous variables. and x2~t is a vector of known predetermined or 
exogenous variables. 
Note that x*l.t• or X2,t may or may not contain policy variables 
which are either expected or known depending on the the relevant 
theoretical considerations used to develop the model. X*l.t and x2,t 
may also contain the actual realization of a variable and its expected 
value if it is believed that both variables influence the level of the 
dependent variable. Also note that at this point the variables Y*t and 
x*l.t must really be defined as anticipations on the part of agents. 
Anticipations which may or may not be isomorphic transformations of 
statistical expectations. This is an important point to which I will 
return later in the paper. B, A. T1. T2. have dimensions (g x g). 
(g x g).(g x kl)• and (g x (k-kl)), respectively. Note that not all of 
the endogenous variables in the system need enter as expectations in 
which case the corresponding columns of the square matrix A will be 
identically zero. 
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This system can be routinely solved for the implied rationally 
anticipated vector Y*t as: 
( 2) •.• 
( 3) ••. 
E(Byt) = E(-Ay*t) -E(Tlx*l.t- T2x2,t + Ut.) 
Y*t = -(B+A)-1 Ttx*1.t - (B+A)-1 Tz.tx2.t· 
The reduced form system for (1) can then be easily written as: 
(4)... Yt = B-1 A(B+A)-1 - B-1 T1)x*1 
+ (B-1 A(B+A)-1 - B-1 T2)xz + B-1 Ut· 
Plausibility of Rational Forecasts 
Examination of equation (2) clearly illustrates a major criticism 
which has been directed at the "optimality" of the rational expectations 
hypothesis by Frydman (1982.1984) and others. In equation (2) it is 
apparent that the individual rational expectation E(Byt) is a function 
of the average of expectations E(-Ay*t) of all agents in the market. The 
implication of simply moving E(-Ay*t) from the right hand side of (2) to 
the left is to postulate that every individual agent knows the behavi-
oral parameters of the other agents in the market. As Frydman demon-
strates, it is not likely that economic agents can ascertain the average 
expectation of other market participants in decentralized markets yet 
this is required if rational expectations is to have any operational 
meaning. Moreover. Frydman demonstrates that in a market characterized 
by a large number of producers. operating as price takers in a highly 
decentralized market which is very similar to that which characterizes 
agricultural markets. producers cannot learn the relevant parameters of 
the rational expectations equilibrium and cannot form rational forecast 
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functions. This point is generally overlooked in the applied a~ricul­
tural economics literature. 
Agricultural Policy and the Lucas Critique 
The implications of rational expectations and the Lucas critique 
can be clearly addressed by considering equations (3) and (4). From (3) 
we can see that if expectations are formed according to the rational 
expectations hypothesis the structure of those expectations is deter-
mined by the s~ructure of the model. i.e •• the matrices B.A.Tl.T2• as 
well the structure inherent in the expectations process for the vector 
x*l.t· When Muth wrote in 1961 "that the expectations of firms tend to 
be distributed about the prediction of the theory" he was asserting that 
(3) is the equilibrium forecasting function used by economic agents and 
that on the average they know with certainty the parameters embodied in 
the compound matrices in (3). 
Note, however, that this does not say anything about the structure 
of the expectations processes used to predict x*l.t• some of which may 
be policy variables. Indeed, it is usually assumed that these processes 
are derived as some variant of a optimal statistical predictor based on 
own past information. and do not have the form or structure of a 
rationally formed expectation (Fisher). 
Alternatively, if we were to assume that expectations are formed by 
a much more simple process such as naive expectations: 
(5) ... Y*t = Yt-1· 
we find that (4) reduces to: 
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(6) ••• Yt =- B-lAYt-1- B-lrl x*l.t- B-1T2x2.t+ B -lut. 
Obviously. under this specification. equations (4) and (6) are not the 
same. Even though we have not postulated a rational expectations model 
for equation (6), we still have to be aware that the structure of the 
expectations on the vector x*l.t• some of which may be policy variables 
influences the behavior of the complete system through the structural 
matrices B-1. and T1. Similar conclusions can be drawn if we assume 
that expectations are formed adaptively. 
Given that our primary interest is to identify the linkages between 
the behavior of the system or specific endogenous variables in the 
system and alternative processes for generating the policy variables 
contained in the vector x*1,t• we need to explicitly consider how the 
expectations x*l,t = E(xl.t I Qt-1) where Qt-1 is the as yet unspecified 
information set, can be formulated. Obviously, we could (and maybe 
should) argue that producers are as politically astute as they are 
economically and model x*l,t as an endogenous component of a complete 
simultaneous equation political system. For even more obvious reasons 
this has not been the standard practice in either the expository or 
empirical rational expectations literature. 
The traditional approach is to postulate that the process gener-
ating each of the variables in the vector x*l,t can be characterized 
and modeled as a univarate stochastic process. in which the relevant 
information comprising E(x1,ty I Qt-1) is only the past levels of xl,t 
(Fisher. Nerlove. et al .• 1980: Wallis. 1980). This of course assumes 
that there is not a set of variables outside the model and independent 
of the model's error structure which helps forecast the elements of the 
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vector x*l.t· This may not be a very useful nor accurate presumption 
when most policy variables are designed to explicitly impact on the 
behavior of the system of which they are a part and will most usually be 
linked in some manner to the past behavior of the system itself. a point 
which is considered explicitly in much of the macroeconomics literature 
but which seems to be somewhat overlooked in the agricultural economics 
literature. 
Ignoring ~his last somewhat troublesome point for the time being. 
we can proceed by assuming a very general form for the stochastic 
process generating the variables in the expectations vector x*I.t· 
Assume that this process takes the form of a vector autoregressive 
moving average (ARMA) model for x1.t: 
(7) ..• $(L)xl,t = 6 (L) ~t 
where €t is a white noise process independent of Ut· and $(1) and 9(1) 
are polynomials in the lag operator 1 of degree p and q. respectively. 
vis .. 
As Wallis (1981) has demonstrated. normalization of the moving average 
side of (7) can be achieved in many ways. each of which has specific 
implications for the final form ot the reduced form equations (3). 
The standard aporoach is to express (7) as an infinite auto-
regressive representation based on the expansion: 
I -
re(1} - $(1)1 r e(L) J 
which gives us the optimal predictor: 
( 9 ) ... xl.t = ~( 1) xl.t-1 ' 
where the substitution of (9) into the reduced from equation (4) yields 
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the final form equations. Each endogenous variable is given as a 
distributed lag function of the exogenous variables: 
(10) •.. yt = (B-lA(B+A)-l- B-lTl) V(L)x1 ,t_1 + (B-lA(B+A)-1- B-1T2)x2 .t 
+ B-1 
ut 
Any change in the process by which the variables in the vector x*1 .t are 
generated. which by assumption would occur in the event of a policy 
change. will alter the parameters of the complex polynomial V(L) and the 
reduced form coefficients given by: 
-1 -1 -1 (11) ••. TTl= (B A(B+A) - B T1) V(L). 
An important point to notice is that these same policy implications hold 
for other endogenous expectations models as well. 
For example if we assume that producers naively form expectations 
on the endogenous variables in the system and forecast optimally in the 
minimum mean squared error sense (MMSE) the expected values of the 
exogenous variables, some of which may be policy variables, we can 
specify (10) as: 
Obviously. the Lucas Critique holds for this model as well. Any change 
in the parameters of the polynomial V(L) will also alter the reduced 
form coefficients given by: 
The same conclusion can be demonstrated for adaptive expectations 
models. From this it is apparent that the Lucas critique is pertinent 
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to policy modeling regardless of the hypothesized expectations model. as 
long as the policy environment is taken to be exogenous to the system 
(1} as is usually the case. 
The preceding development raises the qu~stion of whether or not it 
is possible to distinguish between the specification of a model in which 
rational expectations are postulated versus some other formulation such 
naive expectations and indeed whether it is at all important in applied 
policy modelin~. A central feature of the REH formulation of a model is 
the existence of a number of within and cross-equation parameter 
restrictions which are unique to the model specification and REH. It is 
common practice to rely on statistical tests of these restrictions as a 
means of supporting the REH or rejecting it in empirical work. 
In answer to the first question I would argue that in applied 
policy modeling it is difficult to distinguish between either structural 
or final form specifications as implied by the various expectations 
models. Because of the large number of normalizations on the stochastic 
process for the vector x*l.t it is possible to generate final form 
equations with an almost limitless specification form in terms of the 
included right hand side variables. 
For example as Wallis (1981) has shown. the presence of a ARMA 
(p,q) model for the vector x*l.t• with a normalization expressing x*l.t 
in its pure autoregressive form will result in a final form system which 
includes as right hand side variables a distributed lag on the endo-
genous variables of order q, and a distributed lag on the xl.t variables 
of order max(p,q). 
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If we chose p=q=l. then we have a rational expectations tinal form 
system which is identical to that generated by the naive expectations 
(6) with a simple ARMA(l.O) model for the vector x*l,t· In general if 
we postulate an ARMA(p.q) process for the vector x*l,t with p>l and q>l 
we can generate a rational expectations final form which is equivalent 
to that generate by the adaptive expectations hypothesis (Wallis, 1981). 
The inclusion of other structural properties into the model such as 
biological lags or cost of capital adjustment which lead independently 
to dynamic final form equations increases the difficulty of disen-
tangling the underlying parameters and hence testing the model specifi-
cation from the expectations specification. 
Because of the non-uniqness of the normalization one wishes to 
choose for the stochastic processes included in the model. statistical 
tests of the parametric restrictions are jointly tests of the model 
specification, the normalization chosen and the REH. a point carefully 
considered by Hoffman and Schlagenhuaf. An acceptance or rejection can 
relate to any or all of these joint hypotheses simultaneously. Even 
though it may be very difficult to identify and empirically substantiate 
the exact type of expectations formulation being used by producers in 
applied policv modeling, I would argue that it is not really important 
to do so. 
As the preceeding development hopefully has demonstrated. we must 
not ignore how changes in the policy structure will alter our parameter 
estimates when we evaluate alternative policies irrespective of what we 
want to assume about the rationality of the producers expectations 
mechanisms. 
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Anticipations vs. Conditional Expectations: A Final Argument 
In setting up the definition of rational expectations. Muth took 
the position that economic agents unobserved anticipation of the leve1 
of an economic variable such as market price could be represented by the 
mathematical conditional expectation of that variable given the para-
meters of the underlying economic system. In fact he went beyond this 
to argue that this anticipation was in fact equivalent to the con-
ditional expectation. Progressing from equation (1) wherein the vector 
y*t is most appropriately defined in terms of unknown anticipations to 
equation (4) requires that we uncritically accept this transformation. 
We may in fact question the validity of such an argument. Asserting 
that the mechanics of human perception are equivalent to those of 
mathematical expectation is to maintain that the theory of human 
perception and mathematical statistics are isomorphic (Brodbeck). We 
know verv litt]e about the theory of human perception as it pertains to 
economics so it is convenient to substitute the concepts. laws and 
constants from a more widely known theory. However. without proper 
verification that this correspondence is in fact one-to-one. it becones 
difficult to assess the validity of tests of the rational expectations 
hypothesis. Such tests are jointly tests of the particular structure 
employed by the econometrician and the degree to which one can replace 
such concepts as anticipation with mathematical expectation. This 
latter test is, to the authors knowledge. almost completely ignored in 
the rational expectations literature. Where attempts have been made to 
verify the existence of such an isomorphic correspondence in general 
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very little support has been found for the hypothesis (Slavic. Tversky 
and Kahneman. Goldberg. Slovic. Fischhoff and Lichtenstein). 
REVIEW OF SELECTED EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 
Much of the literature in the agricultural journals which considers 
the rational expectations hypothesis has been either conceptual or 
expository in nature. However some authors have attempted to test 
hypothesis in various agricultural markets. Also. the non-agricultural 
economics litetature has produced many more attempts at verification. 
One of the earliest applied rational expectations papers to appear 
in the agricultural economics literature was presented by Shonkwiler and 
Spreen (1983). In this paper the authors present a closed-form macro-
model of the Florida Escarole lettuce market. The model is set up as a 
four equation system with an acreage. yield. demand and a market 
clearing identity. Three expectations formulations are derived and 
incorporated in to the model. These are a dynamic cobweb. rational. and 
a mixed version of the first two. The authors argue that the mixed 
version should increase the flexibility of the model. Expectations on 
the exogenous variable were modeled as either deterministic polynomials 
or as ARMA processes normalized as pure autoregressive processes. Each 
of these models was estimated by a nonlinear three-stage least squares 
procedure. The authors conclude 
''The results ... do not support the postulate of rational 
expectations as it is used in the acreage equation •.•. In 
addition. the parameter restrictions imposed across equations 
by the acreage equation using both rational and mixed expec-
tations result in marginally poorer structural fits for the 
associated yield and demand equations relative to the dynamic 
cobweb model •.• These findings strongly suggest that the 
rational expectations hypothesis is not appropriate for 
modeling supply response in the Florida escarole market." 
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A second study by Shonkwiler and Emerson focused on the Florida 
winter tomato market. In this paper. the authors develop a four 
equation supply and demand model of the winter tomato market in Florida. 
The model consists of an acreage. yield. demand and market clearing 
equations. 
Rational expectations are incorporated into the model by solving 
for the expect~d market clearing price and generating the observable 
reduced form. Expectations on exogenous variables are handled in the 
usual way by assuming that they can be modeled as ARIMA processes. In 
addition to the rational model, the authors test a cobweb model by using 
lagged price as the expectation. Full information maximum likelihood is 
applied to estimate the parameters subject to the implied cross-equation 
restrictions. The authors also incorporate a test suggested by Revenkar 
which nests a restricted rational expectations hypothesis in the more 
general framework. 
The conclusion reached by the authors is that: 
"the rational expectations specification is consistent with 
the data for the winter tomato market. Moreover. the results 
suggest superior performance in interpreting acreage decisions 
than for the more typical cobweb model". 
It should be pointed out that in the particular model formulation 
chosen by the authors. they include a one period lag on the acreage 
variable t~us claiming that the model is dynamic. This may in fact lead 
to substantial difficulties of interpretation of the specification vs. 
expectations tests (Wallis. 1981. Hoffman and Schlagenhauf). 
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In a more recent effort at testing the rational expectations 
hypothesis as it applies to agricultural markets, Goodwin and Sheffrin 
apply the concept to the U.S. broiler market. Their model is similar to 
that presented by Huntzinger. The model includes an aggregate supply 
and demand equation along with a market clearing identity. Rational 
expectations are included in the usual way. Exogenous expectations are 
treated as ARIMA forecasts and included in the model as observed data. 
As with most studies of this type. the equations relating to the market 
under scrutiny and the exogenous forecasts are estimated separately. As 
a novel approach to the problem, Goodwin and Sheffrin estimate a purely 
univarite ARIMA model of broiler prices and then compare the forecast 
error oftthis against the forecast error derived from the conditional 
expectations on broiler price using the full model. It is argued that 
if expectations are formed rationally then the later should have a 
smaller forecast error variance. The rationality hypothesis is tested 
by use of a likelihood ratio test on the overidentifying restrictions 
implied by the hypothesis. As an additional test. the authors include 
the futures price for iced broilers into the rational price forecasting 
equation to determine if this additional information adds significantly 
to forecasting broiler prices. 
On the basis of these three somewhat disparet tests, the authors 
conclude that U.S. broiler supply is in accord with the rational 
expectations hypothesis. It should be pointed out that the authors do 
explicitly recognize that the likelihood test is jointly a test of the 
rationality assumption and the model specification. Also. the fact that 
the reduced form equation on broiler price has a significantly smaller 
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forecast error variance than the univarate ARIMA or model does not 
provide evidence that broiler producers form expectations rationally. 
All that can be concluded contrary to the authors claims, is that the 
inclusion of the additional information from their structural model is 
in fact useful in reducing forecast error (Frydman, 1982). 
Turning now from agricultural models to more general economic 
models, Jones and Roley test the rationality hypothesis in a model of 
the term structure for three and six month Treasury bills. This hypo-
thesis is jointly tested with the hypothesis that the term structure 
accurately represents equilibrium yields. As such it was not possible 
to separate these two hypothesis. The authors conclude that: 
"The empirical results indicated that the null hypothesis that 
investors form their expectations rationally and the expecta-
tions model of the term structure accurately represents 
equilibrium yields could be rejected at an extremely low 
significance level." 
In the previous studies rationality of expectations is tested for 
in an indirect method. That is, the tests of the hypothesis are based 
on the within and cross-equation restrictions implied by the hypothesis. 
A direct test would focus directly on whether or not expectations met 
the unbiasedness condition and whether or not the forecast error was 
strictly independent of the pertinent information set used to form the 
expectation. In the following two studies. rationality is tested 
directly. using actual observed expectations of some economic variable. 
In an early study of this type. Turnovsky (1970) investigates the 
empirical evidence on the structure of price expectations in the United 
States during the post-Korean War period. Turnovsky utilizes the well 
known Joseph A. Livingston expectations data published in the 
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Philadelphia Bulletin. The data consists of six and tw~lve month 
expectations on the Consumers' Price Index and the unemployment rate. In 
this study. Turnovsky develops a series of models for both short-term 
and long-term expectations reflecting the adaptive, extrapolative, 
weighted and rational expectations models (Turnovsky. 1970. 
pp. 1442-43). The data are taken over two periods, 1954 to 1964. and 
1962-1969. 
Turnovsky tests the validity of each of the implied expectations 
models by direct use of the micro data. Acceptance or rejection of a 
particular model rests on the agreement of the estimated parameters with 
their theoretical expectation and the overall ability of the model to 
accurately predict the actual price changes. 
On the basis of his data and specified models, Turnovsky concludes 
"As far as the relative merits of the different expectations 
hypotheses are concerned. the evidence appears to favor the 
extrapolative scheme.". 
and with respect to the rational expectations hypothesis, he concludes: 
these results suggest that the standard expectations hypotheses 
tend to be inconsistent with the assumption of rationality." 
In a more recent use of the Livingston data, Pearce examines the 
question of rationality by using the individual forecasts of Standard 
and Poors Stock Index (SPI) as recorded by the Livingston Survey. His 
data base includes over 2000 observations on 6 and 12 month expecta-
tions. Two tests of the rationality assumption are presented. First. 
after adjusting for heteroskedasticity. the unbiasedness of expecta-
tions. a necessary condition. is tested by regressing the actual SPI 
value on the recorded expectation: 
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where At is the actual value and Ef·l is the recorded expectatjon 6 or 
12 months prior. Unbiasedness requires that a=O and b=1. As set forth 
by Muth. this is a necessary although not sufficient condition which 
must hold for rationality. 
Pearce estimated this equation for both forecast horizons and for 
three sub-periods of the data. He concludes: 
" •.• the hypothesis that the survey predictions are unbiased is 
strongly rejected ... the survey predictions fail to satisfy 
the this necessary condition for rationality." 
As an additional test of the hypothesis, Pearce examines the 
relationship between the forecast error and a set of macroeconomic 
variables which serves as the exogenous information set upon which the 
forecasts may have been based. Under the rational expectations hypo-
thesis. this forecast error must be statistically independent of the 
variables in the information set. Leaving out possible relevant 
variables from the specified information set does not affect the 
validity of the test to reject the hypothesis. Any bias is 1n favor of 
the rationality hypothesis (Abel and Mishkin). 
Applying this informational efficiency test to the Livingston data. 
Pearce concludes 
"This null hypothesis (rationality) is rejected at the 1 
percent level for each measure of forecast error .••• In most 
cases. the forecast errors are significantly correlated w1th 
even the known past change in the stock price index itself. 
The results for the two sub-periods y1eld the same conclusion. 
Thus. the survey data strongly reject the hypothesis of 
rationality." 
As a final example of a test of the rationality hypothesis. 
consider the recent applied work of Nerlove (1983). In this particular 
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study. Nerlove argues that the question of the appropriate expectation 
model may be usefully addressed by a direct appeal to the data on micro 
observations as opposed to disentangling the expectations from a model 
of behavior. Nerlove uses direct observations on expectations and their 
realizations taken from surveys administered to German firms and French 
firms. Unlike other studies which have used micro data. the Nerlove 
study uses data which is categorical and not quantitative in form. The 
test of alternative expectations models is carried out by the appli-
cation of a log-linear probability model to both the German and French 
data. With respect to the rationality hypothesis. Nerlove concludes 
"To the extent that firms make systematic errors and to the 
degree to which the relations between the ex ante and the 
corresponding ex post variables are stable over time. doubt is 
cast on the validity of the rational expectations hvpothesis 
in its simplist form •••• Because of the categorical nature of 
the data. one should be cautious in interpreting these results 
as evidence against rational expectations. but the simpler 
forms of the hypothesis are clearly not supported." 
Conclusions 
Economists have been aware that economic agents anticipations of 
the future levels and/or rates of change in key variables influences 
their decision process. Early attempts to incorporate this notion into 
econometric models lead to hypotheses about how anticipations are formed 
which resulted in ad hoc specification of this complex process. Of 
major concern was the fact that the expectations models where funda-
mentally inconsistent with the structure of the econometric models being 
developed and used. This was manifest in the fact that the reduced form 
price equation generated from most simultaneous econometric models was 
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not consistent with the price forecasting equation assumed to represent 
agents anticipations. 
Muth presented an argument which did away with this inconsistency 
by replacing agents expectations with that of the reduced form equation 
from the econometric models at hand. Expectations formed in this manner 
were then consistent with the econometricians view of the world as 
specified by his models. Muth's argument was not that every agents 
expectation was formed in this rational manner. but that the average 
expectation across agents was an unbiased estimated drawn from the same 
probability distribution as the actual variable. 
An outcome of Muth's work was incorporation of rational expec-
tations into all sorts of economic modelling efforts. In addition. with 
the work of Lucas. sound policy analysis has become synonymous with the 
concept. This arose out of the observation that the structural para-
meters of the econometric model where not independent of the structural 
parameters of the truly exogenous variables in the system. many of which 
may be policy variables. Changes in the structure which generates the 
policy variables would require simultaneous changes in the parametric 
specification of the estimated econometric model. This was something 
that was not clearly understood (or at least articulated in the litera-
ture) prior to the exploration of the rationality hypothesis. 
The purpose of this paper has been to hopefully elucidate the 
various aspects and claims made for rational expectations from the 
perspective of applied policy modeling. It has not been to decry the 
work presently being carried out in this area. Indeed. the work of Muth 
and Lucas have caused all econometricians and policy analysts to delve 
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more deeply into the role play~d bv anticipations 1n economics science. 
This will. I am sure. be recorded as one of the major advents in the 
field of economic science in this century. 
However. it is also apparent from reading the literature. that 
substantially unfounded claims and uncritical applications of the 
rationality hypothesis are being made. I believe that it is imperative 
that we not embrace this hypothesis as axiomatic particularily in 
applied agricultural policy models. As the evidence presented in this 
paper suggests, the existence of rational expectations on the part of 
economic agents cannot be consistently supported. In fact. it is more 
than a little disconcerting that some agents are rational while some are 
not. I would argue that rationality if it exists as defined herein is a 
human condition which is not randomly distributed throughout various 
economic or social groups. Why are tomato producers in Florida and 
broiler producers in the U.S. 'rational' while escarole producers in 
Florida, investors in treasury bills, and policy makers. businessmen and 
professional economists and stockbrokers are not? 
22 
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